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Abstract
Religions typically prescribe their followers to display distinct behavior in
consumption, production, and exchange. Well-known are the examples of Catholics
not eating meat on Fridays during Lent, Hindus being vegetarian and Muslims and
Jews avoiding pork, Muslims praying five times a day, and Jews and Christians
observing the Sabbath. As a common theme in these examples, individuals are
asked to commit to a behavioral pattern by consistently choosing one course of
action over its alternatives and not to deviate from the pattern even as circumstances (e.g., prices, cost, endowment) change. Although some followers of a
religion may not be observing a prescribed behavior strictly and there may be
some nonreligious individuals who might also be displaying the same pattern,
that all followers typically observe the same pattern but with varying levels of
compliance nevertheless suggests a source of behavioral commitment emanating
from religious belief. Economists typically approach this type of behavior in one
of two general ways. The first is to view religious behavior as being less rational
or outright irrational and thus outside of the domain of economics. An alternative approach that has recently grown in popularity has been to provide economic
explanations of the nature and consequences of religious behavior. These explanations typically apply economic concepts and models by viewing believers as
rational consumers and religious organizations as clubs or firms that collectively
constitute a religious market. Supply side factors like differences in opportunity
sets, demand side factors like distinct preferences of believers, or social factors
like peer-pressure have been variously proposed to explain distinct behavior.1 We
advocate a third general approach in this paper by borrowing insights from other
disciplines, particularly from philosophy. Identifying the weaknesses of previous
economic explanations, we offer an alternative explanation that relies on philosophical discussions on the concept of integrity. We use the notion of integrity
defined as identity-conferring commitments to develop an economic analysis of
choice. Focusing on religious behavior, we use the analysis to show the way the
influence of commitment on behavior differs from those of preferences and social
pressure. We also discuss extensions of the argument to related issues such as the
multiplicity of the dimensions of identity.
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Rationality, Integrity, and Religious Behavior

Religions typically prescribe their followers to display distinct behavior in consumption,
production, and exchange. Well-known are the examples of Catholics not eating meat on
Fridays during Lent, Hindus being vegetarian and Muslims and Jews avoiding pork, Muslims
praying five times a day, and Jews and Christians observing the Sabbath. As a common theme in
these examples, individuals are asked to commit to a behavioral pattern by consistently choosing
one course of action over its alternatives and not to deviate from the pattern even as
circumstances (e.g., prices, cost, endowment) change. Although some followers of a religion
may not be observing a prescribed behavior strictly and there may be some nonreligious
individuals who might also be displaying the same pattern, that all followers typically observe
the same pattern but with varying levels of compliance nevertheless suggests a source of
behavioral commitment emanating from religious belief.
Economists typically approach this type of behavior in one of two general ways. The
first is to view religious behavior as being less rational or outright irrational and thus outside of
the domain of economics. An alternative approach that has recently grown in popularity has
been to provide economic explanations of the nature and consequences of religious behavior.
These explanations typically apply economic concepts and models by viewing believers as
rational consumers and religious organizations as clubs or firms that collectively constitute a
religious market. Supply side factors like differences in opportunity sets, demand side factors
like distinct preferences of believers, or social factors like peer-pressure have been variously
proposed to explain distinct behavior.1
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See Iannaccone (1998) for a review of this literature.
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We advocate a third general approach in this paper by borrowing insights from other
disciplines, particularly from philosophy. Identifying the weaknesses of previous economic
explanations, we offer an alternative explanation that relies on philosophical discussions on the
concept of integrity. We use the notion of integrity defined as identity-conferring commitments
to develop an economic analysis of choice. Focusing on religious behavior, we use the analysis
to show the way the influence of commitment on behavior differs from those of preferences and
social pressure. We also discuss extensions of the argument to related issues such as the
multiplicity of the dimensions of identity.

Why not Eat Pork? A Conversation of Economists on Religious Behavior
Suppose you notice during a dinner reception at an academic conference of economists
that two colleagues, whom you happen to know as being of the Jewish and Muslim faiths, choose
fish over pork. Being a curious individual and a fan of roasted pork loin, you ask: “Why did you
choose fish?” And both reply: “Because my religion prohibits me from eating pork.” 2 You are
not satisfied with the answer because, although you know of the prohibitions against pork in
these religions, you also vaguely remember other Jewish or Muslim colleagues who have had
pork in similar receptions in the past. Other economists join the conversation and a heated
debate starts. Realizing that the debate is about religion, some quickly leave the scene thinking
that economists should shy away from such questions, while others rush in because they think
economics provides powerful explanations of religious behavior.3
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For the historical roots of the prohibition of pork, see Lobban (1994).
For a review of the relationship of religion to economics in intellectual history, see Welch and Mueller (2001). For
examples and reviews of the recent literature on economics and religion, see Iannaccone (1998) and the
contributions on the 1994 special issue (vol. 150, no. 4) of The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
3
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One of them argues that the choice of fish follows directly from these colleagues’
preferences, as shaped by their religious beliefs and patterns of socialization. She argues that
preferences and choice behavior in general are shaped by the social, cultural, and religious
environment. Given such preferences, her colleagues’ choice of fish over pork is simply an
instance of rational choice, based on the maximization of utility. To support these arguments,
she mentions examples of work done on preferences and in the field of religious economics. 4
Not everyone is convinced, however. Her Muslim colleague states: “I’ve never had pork in my
life; how could I have formed preferences over it?” As the debate over the formation of
preferences continues, some think that economists have little to say on preferences. Others seem
afraid to discuss preferences in the first place.
Someone argues that tastes should be viewed as being stable over time and similar among
people and that differences in behavior should be explained by differences in prices and incomes
only (Gary Becker and George Stigler, 1977) He goes on to state: “Even in explaining religious
behavior we would be better off focusing on differences in opportunity sets, rather than
differences in preferences and beliefs.” He gives examples of work done by Laurence
Iannacconne and others that extended the Chicago school approach to the economics of religion.
He quotes Iannacconne (1995: 77) as arguing: “the rational choice theorist is almost never
content to explain [changes in religious behavior] with reference to changed tastes, norms, or
beliefs.” Confused, someone else asks: “What does that have to do with choosing fish over
pork?” The reply comes that such dietary restrictions are simply examples of religious norms
that constrain the behavior of members of religious groups in order to alleviate various
externality problems (e.g., monitoring participation) that such groups are likely to face. These
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See, for example, Bowles (1998), Douglas and Isherwood (1979), George (2001), Granovetter (1985), Hausman
and MacPherson (1994), Kuran (1994), McPherson (1983), and West and McKee (1983).
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norms affect behavior not by shaping the preferences but by restricting the opportunity set and
making it costlier to choose the alternatives. The confusion appears to remain: “I’m still not
clear. There would be no such cost to eating pork when one is alone, so what if someone still
does not eat it?”
Someone watching all this quietly thus far joins the conversation at this point, stating:
“This all boils down to social influence on choice. The real issue is not whether the choice of
fish over pork follows from the demand side (preferences) or the supply side (opportunity set)
alone, but how our choices are made in social settings and influenced by the social environment.
Going back to your question: these colleagues would not choose pork over fish because they
would be afraid that if seen eating pork they would be ostracized from their religious group.” He
mentions Timur Kuran’s (1990) work on preference falsification, which suggests that social
pressures might cause an individual to choose differently in public than in private. 5 The Jewish
colleague vehemently objects: “I have never had pork in my life, not even when I was all by
myself with no one around to see me.” The Muslim colleague nods his head in agreement. The
ensuing discussion provides more examples of the consistency of most religious behavior
between private and public settings, indicating that social pressure alone cannot explain why
religious people display distinct behavior in consumption, production, and exchange. A
consensus seems to emerge that a satisfactory explanation of religious behavior should go
beyond preferences, opportunity sets, and social pressure.
Similar conversations can be heard elsewhere in trying to understand other types of
religious behavior. Consider the allocation of time to worship and prayer. Supposing leisure and
worship as being the only activities available, we can easily construct parallel arguments to
explain how people choose these activities. The explanation of religious behavior based on
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distinct preferences would suggest that, given their religious upbringing and associated forms of
worship, individuals have been socialized into receiving utility from worship and prayer.
Muslims would thus rather pray five times a day than spend the same time for leisure as a matter
of preference, and similarly Jews and Christians prefer going to Synagogue and Church over
leisure. Parallel explanations would emerge from supply side arguments and those emphasizing
social pressure. For example, whereas the supply side arguments might explain these behaviors
by focusing on the restricted set of activities available to individuals on the Sabbath, arguments
based on social pressure might emphasize the way individuals pray and worship to avoid social
pressure and to meet the expectations of friends and family members.

Integrity
To contribute to the discussion and understanding of religious behavior, we rely on
philosophical insights on integrity. At its coarsest level, a person of integrity can be thought of
as one who is honest and of character. Philosophers probe deeper. For instance, the Oxford
Companion to Philosophy puts it this way:

To have integrity is to have unconditional and steady commitment to moral values and
obligations. For such a person, the fundamental question whether to conduct life on the
plane of self-concern or of moral seriousness has been decisively resolved, though
particular life situations will doubtless continue to put that commitment to strenuous test.
This moral commitment becomes a crucial component in his or her sense of identity as a
person: it confers a unity of character… (p.410)

5

See also Coêgel (1994) for audience effects that influence behavior.
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The notion of integrity we adopt is based on a body of research that emphasizes the roles
of commitment and identity for human behavior and interaction. 6 There are two requirements
necessary for an individual to have integrity. The first is that he or she must have commitments.
Commitments are internal requirements or constraints imposed on one’s own self. 7 What sorts
of things could someone be committed to? Williams (in Smart and Williams, 1973: 112)
suggests, "One can be committed to such things as a person, a cause, an institution, a career,
one’s own genius, or the pursuit of danger." Others, like McFall (1987), focus on personal and
moral principles.
The second requirement is that these commitments define a person's identity. Virtually
all philosophers who write on the subject concur that the commitments required by integrity must
also be inextricably linked to one’s own identity. That means that if one violates a commitment,
say to temptation, one loses a sense of self. Utterances like "I could never do that" or "I couldn't
live with myself if I did that" reflect the view that a committed person could not do "that" and
remain the person they wish to be (Korsgaard 1994). Such a loss would be fundamental; it
cannot be formulated as simply a loss in utility.
Taken together, these requirements indicate a definition of integrity as identity-conferring
commitments. 8 Before we apply this definition in economic analysis and examine its
implications for religious behavior, we present some further observations on the philosophical
discussions of commitment and integrity that should further clarify these notions for economists.
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For an analysis of the way identity can affect economic outcomes, see Akerlof and Kranton (2000), who
incorporate the sociology and sociology of identity into an economic model of behavior.
7
See, for instance, Halfon (1989) and Harcourt (1998). Sen (1977) was one of the first to introduce economists to
the notion and importance of commitment. Frank (1987) provides an account of how commitments might be used
strategically. Burke and Reitzes (1991) apply the identity approach to commitment in social psychology. Coêgel
(2001) quantitatively examines the determinants of religious commitment.
8
McFall (1987).
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Commitments are different from preferences. Being committed might prevent one from
choosing preferred actions. Whereas economists consider preferences as exogenously
determined desires, commitments are the product of conscious reflection. 9 The distinction is
crucial because the aim of economic man is to expeditiously fulfill desires in order to achieve
maximal happiness, while a committed individual need not have such a primary goal. 10 Recent
work in social psychology suggests that well-being includes more than just happiness; it also
includes meaning (McGregor and Little, 1998). Whenever commitments and desire conflict, the
person of integrity is obligated to choose in favor of the former. 11
McFall (1987) distinguishes between personal and moral integrity. A person of personal
integrity must uphold commitments against temptation for personal principles, so that there is
coherence between actions and principles. Someone who puts art above all else may thus have
personal integrity. Moral integrity requires personal integrity, but also that the commitments
must involve moral principles (e.g., “don't lie”). However, which moral principles qualify is
somewhat problematic. A person of moral integrity must adhere to moral commitments for what
he or she considers to be the right reasons, even if those reasons are suspect. Because specifying
the correct moral principles in advance for every conceivable context can be problematic
(impossible), Halfon (1989) suggests in the spirit of Aristotelian virtue ethics that a person of
integrity simply be committed to "do what's best."
If one promises to suffer a loss of the most fundamental kind, one’s own identity, by
breaking a commitment, why would someone ever do so? Stated differently, why wouldn't
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For Kantians, the source of this conscious reflection is a free will.
McFall (1987: 8) frames it this way: "If one values not just honesty but honesty for honesty its own sake, then
honesty motivated by self-interest is not enough for integrity."
11
Minkler and Miceli (2001) take integrity to be exogenously but differentially endowed to show that when all
agents promise to cooperate, some won’t, but some will in contraposition to their material interests.
10
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everyone enjoy unlimited integrity? We can think of three reasons.12 First, some people may not
see the importance of identity-conferring commitments. Both the popular culture and the
economist’s approach to human behavior have propagated the notion that well-being consists
solely in fulfilling desires. Some preference-satisfiers may even feign adhering to commitments
in order to gain whatever else they desire. Second, some may wish to adhere to their own
commitments but cannot because of weakness of will. Such people might succumb to desire but
sincerely wish they had the ability not to. And third, some may break their commitments by
rationalizing their actions, or by mentally changing their commitments for reasons of expedience
but not recognize it as such. These are cases of self-deception.
We make two final points on integrity. First, integrity has been famously used by
Williams (in Smart and Williams, 1973) to add yet another nail into utilitarianism's coffin. As
we have emphasized, integrity requires adherence to one’s own commitments (or projects). But
utilitarianism requires one to treat one’s own projects as just one set among many, and therefore
a utilitarian is often compelled to violate his or her own projects in order to fulfill those of
someone else. Thus utilitarianism cannot coherently include integrity. 13 Secondly, while it is
possible for someone else to violate one’s dignity, only the person’s own self can violate his or
her own integrity (Halfon 1989). Each of us, and each of us only, are responsible for our own
integrity.

Identity, Commitment, and Religious Behavior
We now consider these ideas more formally. We begin with the simple case of a single
identity for each individual, assumed to be exogenously determined. To focus on religious
12

The second and third points come from McFall (1987).
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behavior, we only consider religious identities, such as Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, Hindu,
Lutheran, and so on. Of course, one could also be an atheist, follow lesser-known religions, or
even have distinct personal religious beliefs.
Let a denote an action vector taken by an individual and A be the set of all available
actions. All individuals have well-behaved preferences that obey the usual assumptions so that
each individual has a unique utility-maximizing choice, denoted by a* (that is, a* solves Max
U(a) subject to p⋅a ≤ I, where p denotes prices and I income). a* thus represents the action
vector chosen based solely on personal preferences and without any consideration of identity or
commitment.
Religious considerations are formulated as follows. Each religion prescribes either
unique actions, denoted by ª , or no specific actions, in which case individuals are free to do as
they please, which simply means to choose a*. The final choice, however, depends on religious
commitment and integrity. Each individual has a level of commitment to his or her given
religious identity (be it Jewish, Muslim, etc.), denoted by c. Recall that c is the product of
conscious reflection. Assume for simplicity that c ∈ [0,1] and that a higher value of c means a
higher level of commitment. Applying the notion of identity discussed above, we can thus view
c as the level at which commitments confer identity. Thus high c is associated with high
integrity.
Given an individual’s religious identity and the corresponding ª , the level of commitment
c, and the utility maximizing choice a*, he or she would choose a final action, denoted by - , such
that
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Harcourt (1998) extends the argument by suggesting that commitments, the core of integrity, are fundamentally at
odds with utilitarianism and its reliance on preferences.
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- = c ª + (1- c) a*.
It is easy to see the choices corresponding to the extreme cases of individuals with c=0
(no commitment) and c=1 (total commitment). The first is the type of individual who has no
commitment to his or her religious identity and thus places no weight on religious prescriptions
in choosing an action. As a result, - = a*. Put differently, this is the type of individual
considered typical in standard theory of rational choice in economics. The second is the case of
an individual totally committed to a religious identity and chooses actions based solely on
religious considerations, so - = ª . Individuals with 0 < c < 1 would display behavior of varying
degrees of integrity that shows a compromise between utility maximization and religious
prescriptions.
To illustrate, let us apply this setup to examples discussed above. In the example of
dietary choice, ª would be to eat fish for a Jew, a Muslim, and a Catholic on Fridays during lent.
For those with no specific restrictions, ª = a*. Suppose in the absence of religious
considerations individuals have convex preferences between pork and fish, in which case a*
would include positive amounts of both fish and pork. By contrast, the final choice in our
analysis depends on c. For example, a totally committed Jew (c = 1) would choose fish only (-- =
ª ), while one in name only (c = 0) would choose a*. Commitment levels between 0 and 1 would
mean a partial observance of the religious prescription by including some pork in the diet.
Figure 1 shows these possibilities graphically.
Figure 2 similarly shows the example of the allocation of time between worship and
leisure. Suppose a religion prescribes an allocation at ª , which includes some leisure and a high
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level of worship activities like performing personal prayers and attending weekly services.
Suppose also that the utility maximizing allocation for an individual is at a*, with more leisure
and less worship than that at ª . By choosing - as shown, this individual is displaying a level of
commitment strictly between 0 and 1. An example of this type of an individual would be
someone who occasionally chooses to play golf over attending the weekly service.

Previous Explanations and their Limitations
We can now use the analysis to put previous arguments about religious behavior into a
unified framework. Recall that preference based arguments would typically view individuals as
being conditioned to choose prescribed actions strictly as a matter of preference, which with our
notation means a* = ª . Based on this assumption, these arguments suggest - = ª because utility
maximization requires - = a* always, by assumption. We get the same result, but for a different
reason. In our analysis - = ª because (still assuming a* = ª ), - = c ª + (1- c) a* = a* for all c. In
this case, the standard neoclassical result is nested in our analysis including commitment.
Supply side arguments would view individuals as choosing prescribed actions not as a
matter of preference but because the alternatives are not available. With our notation this means
to assume a restricted action set, A r, such that a* ∉ Ar and that in extreme cases perhaps even - =
ª . For example, the sale of pork may be prohibited in Islamic countries, so individuals would
have no choice but not to eat it (and thus eat only fish in the above example). Our analysis also
includes that possibility, but additionally one could choose not to eat pork because of religious
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commitment regardless if the supply constraint is binding. As long as ª ∈ Ar, the alternative
reason one might choose ª is because c=1.
Finally, explanations that emphasize social pressure can be formulated in our analysis as
implying the presence of some social cost to deviating from the prescribed action: a disutility,
denoted by d, whenever - ≠ ª . Regardless of c, the individual may thus choose - = ª because
u(a*) + d ≤ u(ªª ).
The final choice in these arguments is guided directly by the distinct preferences of
religious people, constrained by the available opportunities, or dictated by social pressure.
Although we do not deny that any one of these reasons could indeed be the reason in some
contexts, we nevertheless argue that such explanations fail to explain observed behavior in all
cases. Individuals often follow the religious prescription even when it demands preference
falsification (-- ≠ a*), alternatives are readily available (a* ∈ A), and social pressure is absent (d
= 0). For example, although the presence of distinct preferences might explain the case of a
Catholic who goes to church every Sunday only because he or she truly enjoys the experience, it
does not explain why the same person would observe the lent (thus avoid a preferred item). It
similarly does not explain why Muslims fast from dusk until dawn during the month of
Ramadan. The supply-side explanations similarly fail to explain why a Jew, who would rather
(strictly as a matter of preference) go shopping on a Saturday, ends up going to the Synagogue
even when the malls are open (thus no restriction on the opportunity).
Our emphasis on integrity also identifies a significant failure of the explanations of
religious behavior based on social pressure. These explanations generally fail to explain why
people display the same behavior when no one else is present to observe. There is, of course, an
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important social component to religious behavior, which we do not deny. It is indeed possible
that someone might attend the weekly service to prevent his nosy neighbor from spreading
rumors, or two Muslims might avoid pork and alcohol in a restaurant while eating together.
These do not explain, however, why an individual would attend the service even when the
neighbors are on vacation, or perhaps most fundamentally, why a Muslim would avoid pork and
alcohol even when dining alone at home.
Rather than external pressure or restricted opportunities, we emphasize factors that are
internal to an individual as influencing the choices of actions. Moreover, rather than confining
internal influences to the realm of preferences, we emphasize integrity and commitment. Note,
however, that emphasizing commitment is not the same as arguing that individuals always follow
religious prescriptions. Between the extremes of an individual depicted by the standard choice
theory (c = 0) and a totally committed individual (c = 1) is the (majority of ?) population who for
one reason or another have chosen an intermediary level of commitment to their religious
identities.

Multidimensional Identity
We now generalize the analysis by considering identity as a multidimensional concept.
Each individual exists in the world not only as a religious believer but also possibly as a parent,
worker, friend, spouse, activist, and so on, which jointly constitute his or her identity and sense
of self. 14 Specific dimensions of each person’s identity would of course be determined by such
things as biological characteristics and social environment. Someone could be a 30 year old
Catholic male, single, and working as an engineer in a local factory, while someone else could be
a 40 year old Southern Baptist, female, married with two children, and unemployed. Although
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an individual may be able to choose many of these dimensions, such as whether to be married
and have children, we assume below that one’s identity is exogenously determined. The choice
of these dimensions is certainly an important subject, but outside the scope of this paper. We
assume identity is given, in order to keep the analysis simple and focused on commitment.
Let a* denote utility maximizing actions as before. Identity considerations are
formulated as follows. Suppose there are n dimensions to one’s identity. Corresponding to
dimension j is a prescribed action set denoted by ª j, which for simplicity we assume to be unique
and public knowledge. For example, as workers we are expected to devote a certain amount of
our time to work; as parents we are expected to spend a certain amount of time with our children,
and as believers we are expected to allocate time for worship and prayer. Each of these
dimensions clearly indicates a different prescribed allocation of our time between work, leisure
and worship.
Given the dimensions of an individual’s identity and the corresponding prescribed
actions, he or she chooses a level of commitment, denoted by cj, to each dimension j. c = [c1, c2,
…cn] thus has the important component of deciding how much of our resources and attention to
devote to each dimension, based on our overall purpose in life and the kind of person we would
like to be. The notion of integrity adopted here views [c1, c2, …cn] as the set of commitments
that confers one’s identity and sense of self.
Because of scarce time and resources, we may not be able to fully commit to all
dimensions of our identity. To formalize this constraint, we interpret c j as showing the relative
weight attached to identity j, higher values of c j indicating higher levels of commitment. Put
differently,

14
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∑ j cj + s = 1,
where s is the weight attached to the self that places no consideration on identity.
Identity considerations affect the final choice of an action as follows. Given the
prescribed actions for each identity ª j, the commitment vector c, and the utility maximizing
choice a*, an individual chooses final actions, denoted by - , such that
- = ∑ j cj ª j + s a*.
Extreme cases of individuals with c j = 0 (no commitment) and c j=1 for some identity j
(total commitment) are similar to those discussed earlier in the simpler analysis with a single
(religious) identity. The first is an individual who places no weight on a certain dimension of his
or her identity, which would be the case, for example, if a father imposes no internal requirement
on himself to contribute to his children’s upbringing and thus devotes no time or resources for
that purpose (unless it happens to coincide with his preferences). By contrast, the second is the
type of an individual exclusively committed to a certain identity, such as would be the case when
someone commits his or her life to a religious cause (e.g., an imam, rabbi, or priest) and spends
all of his or her time for this cause, so that - = ª j. For any - # ª j, c is less than its required
level. That could happen either because the individual does not feel entirely committed to the
principle underlying the action, or even if he does he does not have time or resources because of
competing identities and their obligations. Note also the case of ∑ j cj = 0 (or s=1), in which case
an individual places no weight at all on identity considerations in choosing an action. As a result
- = a*, displaying the type of behavior considered typical in standard theory of rational choice in
economics.

16

Extensions and Related Issues
Recognizing the multidimensionality of identity shows the limitations of considering
integrity as a one-dimensional concept. Previous discussions of integrity consider it as being
either present or absent in an individual. For instance, recent economic formulations of integrity
consider it as a continuum, but still in one dimension (Minkler and Miceli, 2001). It is easy to
see that these are special cases of the analyses developed above. The formulation of integrity as
a single dimensional continuum is in some sense identical to the simple analysis presented earlier
for the special case of a single (religious) identity for each individual. Integrity in that context
was a matter of making commitments that confer identity, formalized by the level of c.
Similarly, considering integrity in the more limited sense of being either present or absent would
be the same as formulating c as a binary variable that allows only two choices to individuals: to
commit or not to commit to identity. Although both of these formulations can certainly be
useful, we have to recognize their limitations in making general observations. Unless we can
somehow produce a metric that can measure [c1, c2, …cn] as a single quantity, we have to be
careful about making general statements about integrity in a broader sense. We can easily
imagine someone who is a committed spouse but a lousy believer. Philosophers insist that
integrity requires coherence: consistency among one’s commitments and consistency among
commitments and actions. But even if one holds consistent commitments, the resource
constraint posed by competing identities might mean that an otherwise sincere and committed
person cannot consistently fulfill some of his obligations. Absent criteria to prioritize and
quantify the “values” of different dimensions of identity, we simply have no way of assigning a
single level of integrity to these individuals. We may be left with Halfon’s (1989)
characterization of a person of integrity as simply being committed to “doing what’s best.”
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Considering identity as a multidimensional concept allows us to examine the relationship
between the religious dimension of our identities and other dimensions. The alternatives to the
religious dimension of our identities can be divided into two general categories. The first is the
“utility maximizing” self, whose choice of a* was formalized in the analysis as receiving the
weight s. As discussed earlier, economic models typically consider this as the only relevant
dimension of our selves, so s = 1 corresponds to the type of behavior considered typical in
standard theory of choice. It is well known that economists typically consider the satisfaction of
one’s own preferences as the only motivation for choice. Even alternative motivations, such as
one’s concern for the well-being of others, are modeled as a matter of preference, as somehow
being part of one’s own utility function. Although we do recognize that preference satisfaction is
a motivation for choice, we also include and emphasize commitment, thus permitting a fuller
characterization. Thus, s represents the degree to which we yield to the part of our selves
exclusively concerned about the maximization of utility, regardless of its contents. Put
differently, s is the degree of self-interest.
The second category of alternatives to the religious dimension is the other dimensions of
integrity in our identity. There are certain parallels between our analysis and the models of
consumption choices that suggest a useful analogy to characterize the relationship between two
dimensions of integrity. Just as two goods can be substitutes and complements, two dimensions
of integrity can substitute or complement each other. For example, there are numerous elements
of being a parent and a religious believer that make them complementary to each other. Being a
committed believer and a committed parent often go together, such as for parents who view
teaching religion to their children and taking them to religious activities as essential components
of parenthood. By contrast, being a worker and a religious believer are often substitute
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dimensions of one’s identity. A Muslim has to take time off from work to be able to attend the
Friday prayer, and a workaholic Christian cannot work on Sunday without violating the rules for
the Sabbath.
Distinguishing between substitutes and complements provides a way to examine how
changes in other dimensions of our lives can affect our religious commitment and behavior. We
can view this in two ways. The first is within a static, “partial equilibrium” framework, where a
given change in the commitment level of another dimension can cause religious commitment to
change. For example, the complementarities between parenthood and religiosity indicate that
one might become more religious upon having a child. Similarly, one might be less religious
after being promoted at work to a position that demands a higher level of commitment.
The other way to examine changes in commitment levels is in a “general equilibrium”
framework that considers the overall interdependence between the levels of commitment in a
dynamic setting. For example, the individual who becomes more religious after having a child
may in turn decide to have even more children, as some religions prescribe. Similarly, he or she
may become less committed to work or take a less demanding job. Individuals typically seek
coherence in their identity, which requires a stable equilibrium in commitment levels.
“Externalities” between different dimensions of one’s identity mean that an increasing
commitment to one dimension would lead to higher levels of commitment in complementary
dimensions and lower levels in substitute dimensions, until a new coherent identity is achieved at
a new stable equilibrium.
Explicit formulation of integrity, identity, and commitment in an economic model would
allow economists to provide fresh perspectives to well-known problems and pursue new areas of
research. For example, one of the well-known problems in welfare economics is the distinction

19

between preferences and beliefs as the basis for public policy (Hausman and McPherson, 1994;
Sagoff, 1986). Whereas economists typically view preferences as “hard data” and prescribe
policy based on them, we view this approach as being too simplistic because individuals choose
how much weight to assign to their preferences, and superimposing a 100% weight (s = 1) to
their preferences is unwarranted . Note also that an integrity-based approach provides a different
perspective on the literature of metapreferences (Sen, 1977) by showing the way identity
conferring commitments, rather than higher order preferences, determine our choices of
preferences and actions.
Finally, the hardest task ahead is to find way to explicitly model the choice of
commitments. The difficulty arises because commitments are the product of conscious
reflection. While we treated commitments the same way an economist would treat preferences,
namely as being exogenous, future efforts will need to open the black box. Whereas
commitments, like preferences, may be significantly influenced by the interplay between
genetics and social forces, they also involve free will and conscious reflection, which add a
meta-physical dimension to the analysis.
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Figure 2
The Choice of Worship and Leisure
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